Riba, Interest and Six Hadiths

Riba, Interest and Six Hadiths

Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq

Associate Professor of Economics and Finance
Upper Iowa University

June 2006
[Feedbacks welcome]

The Readers are highly encouraged to read another of my essay
"Islamic Law and the Use and Abuse of Hadith" before this one.

NOTE for fellow Muslims: Because this topic involves w= hat is haram (prohibited) and halal (permissible) in Islam, every Mu= slim MUST do his/her own due diligence and conscientiously reach own position/decision in regard to personal practice. In doing so regarding this matter or any other aspect of life, Muslims should seek guidance from the Qur'an and the Prophetic legacy.

I. Introduction

The Qur'an categorica= lly prohibits riba. However, since there is no unanimity about the definition or scope of this prohibition, we will use the original term r= iba throughout this essay. In the Qur'an it is specified:

Those who devour r= iba will not stand except as stands one whom the Evil One by his touch hath dri= ven to madness. That is because they say: "Trade is like riba but A= llah hath permitted trade and forbidden riba. Those who after receiving direction from their Lord desist shall be pardoned for the past; their case= is for Allah (to judge); but those who repeat (the offence) are companions of = the fire: they will abide therein (for ever) [2/al-Baqarah/275]

O ye who believe! Dev= our not riba, doubled and multiplied; but fear Allah; that ye may (really) prosper. [3/Ale Imran/130]

If ye do it not, Take notice of war from Allah and His Messenger: But if ye turn back, ye shall h= ave your capital sums: Deal not unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly. [2/al-Baqarah/279]

Among other verses th= at deal with riba are: 2/al-Baqarah/276, 278; 4/an-Nisa:160-161. These verses do not really define what is riba and based on the historical practices during the period of revelation, what= is definitely prohibited in the Qur'an is known as riba al-Jahiliyyah.&= nbsp;

"The way in whic= h riba was doubled and redoubled in the pre-Islamic period is expressed by the son= of Zayd b. Aslam (d.136/754) as follows:

Riba in the pre-Islamic period cons= isted of the doubling and redoubling [of money or commodities], and in the age [of the cattle]. At maturity, the creditor would say to the debtor, 'Will you p= ay me, or increase [the debt]? If the debtor had anything, he would pay. Otherwise, the age of the cattle [to be repaid] would be increased ... If t= he debt was money or a commodity, the debt would be doubled to be paid in one year, and even then, if the debtor could not pay, it would be doubled again; one hundred in one year would become two hundred. If that was not paid, the debt would increase to four hundred. Each year the debt would be doubled.&q= uot; [Saeed, p. 22; the above quote is fully annotated in Saeed's work]

The exploitation and injustice of such riba-based transactions are obvious, and hardly require any further explanation or rationalization. This type of riba is known as riba al-jahiliyyah, and according to some Islamic scholars, such as Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, only such riba is unlawful without do= ubt from the Islamic viewpoint.

"The Qur'an vehe= mently condemns riba, but provides little explanation of what that term mea= ns, beyond contrasting riba and charity and mentioning exorbitant 'doubling.' Commentators describe a pre-Islamic practice of extending delay= to debtors in return for an increase in the principal (riba al-jahiliyya). Since this practice is recorded as existing at the time of the revelation, = it is one certain instance of what the Qur'an prohibits. Hence Ibn Hanbal, fou= nder of the Hanbali school, declared that this practice - 'pay or increase' - is= the only form of riba the prohibition of which is beyond any doubt." [Vogel and Hayes, pp. 72-73, quoting Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, d. 1350, I'= lam al-muwaqqa'in 'ala rabb al-'alamin, ed. Taha 'Abd al-Ra'uf Sa'd, Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1973, 2:153-4]

However, gradually, b= ased on hadith, two other types of riba were identified and the scope was widened: riba al-fadl (primarily related to sales transactions), = riba al-nasiya (sales or debt involving deferment). Ibn Abbas, one of the ma= jor companions of the Prophet and earliest of the Islamic jurists, and few other companions (Usama ibn Zayd, 'Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, Urwa ibn Zubayr, Zayd ibn Arqam) "considered that the only unlawfu= l riba is riba al-jahiliyyah." [Saleh, p. 27]

It is important to no= te here that based on riba al-jahiliyyah, usury would be prohibited, but interest as it exists in modern economy and finance and especially in all i= ts forms can't be categorized as prohibited. However, what is not defined by t= he Qur'an, apparently it is defined by hadith, at least, in the case of rib= a. IBF-Net is an online forum focused on Islamic Banking and Finance and has 3,400+ members with interest in this specialized field as scholars, experts, researchers, practitioners, or students. In message #5047 on that forum, Abdulkader Thomas, founder of American Journal of Isl= amic Finance and author of the book Interest in Islamic Economics, participated in a disc= ussion about the definition of riba and how the Qur'an and hadith play a ro= le in defining it. He wrote: "... there is no difference between the Quran and the Hadith, but there are six authenticated hadith that allow us to define this forbidden thing."

It is broadly agreed = that the Qur'an does not define riba. Even second Caliph Umar, one of the closest companions of the Prophet, regretted about inadequate guidance about this matter from the Prophet.

Umar b. al-Khattab sa= id, "There are three things. If Allah's Messenger had explained them clear= ly, it would have been dearer to me than the world and what it contains: (These are) kalala, riba, and khilafa. [Sunan Ibn Majah, Book= of Inheritance, Vol. 4, #2727; Ibn Majah adds: "According to al-Zawa'id, = the authorities of its isnad are reliable, but it has munqata chain of transmission." p. 113; munqata means an interrupted, brok= en or discontinuous chain]

At the time of the revelation of the verses about riba, only type of riba known = was riba al-jahiliyyah. If only that type is considered, usury (exploitative, exorbitant rate of interest) or usurious transactions would be prohibited. However, later, the scope of the definition of riba was broadened ba= sed on hadith. What Abdulkader Thomas referred= to are those hadiths (and there are more hadiths in a number of variations) th= at are commonly presented by the orthodoxy as textual proof for the definition= of riba. Using the broadened definition, the orthodoxy considers modern interest in = all its forms as prohibited. In this essay, we examine those six hadiths to bet= ter understand the claim that these hadiths define riba. I should clarify that there are definitely a lot more than six hadiths pertaining to riba= . The only significance of the number "six" in the title of this es= say in terms of hadith or themes of hadiths pertaining to riba is merely= the claim of an expert in Islamic finance that these six hadiths (or themes of hadiths) define what is riba.

In message [#5078], Thomas shared the six hadiths. However, before= we discuss these hadiths, there are a few things about hadith that need to be understood. There are several myths about hadith, such as the following:

1.      = If a hadith qu= otes the Prophet, we know that's exactly what the Prophet said.

2.      = Sahih collections contain hadith th= at are indisputable

3.      = There is no contradiction in any hadith

4.      = Hadith provides knowledge or information that is certain or definitive

For the discussion on hadith in this essay, myth #1 and #4 are particularly relevant. What is important to note here is that a hadith being sahih (authentic) <= /i>does not necessarily mean that it provides definitive (or certainty of) knowledg= e. Only mutawatirtype of hadith - a hadith which is reported by such a large number of people that they cannot be expected to agree upon a lie, al= l of them together - yields certainty of knowledge about a particular hadith. Ev= en then, only mutawatir bil lafz (mutawatir hadiths that contain exact words in each chain) belongs to this category of hadith that yield certaint= y of knowledge. Mutawatir bil ma'na (mutawatir hadiths that contain only similar, but not exact words in each chain) do not carry the same weig= ht. The first type, mutawatir bil lafz, is very few in number. Indeed, scholars have identified fewer than a dozen hadiths that belong to this category. Non-mutawatir hadiths are known as ahad (soli= tary). Overwhelming number of sahih hadiths are ahad and yields only= probabilistic knowledge. They can still be reasonably reliable for guidance, as l= ong as we (a) acknowledge the probabilistic nature of the source and do not cla= im certainty in regard to the issue in question, (b) do not formulate laws, co= des or dogmas that are too rigid or harsh, especially pertaining to people's li= fe, honor and property, and (c) do not claim finality in terms of authoritative= ness of any laws, codes or dogmas. For a detailed discussion about these myths as well as mutawatir/ahad classifications of hadiths, please read an es= say of this author "Islamic Law and The Use and Abuse of Hadith."&n= bsp;

Hadith #1: Theme - "No riba in spot transactions" or No riba except in deferment/credit

a. From Usamah ibn Zayd: The Pr= ophet, peace be on him, said: "There is no riba except in = nasi'ah [waiting].&quo= t; [Bukhari, Kitab al-Buyu, Bab Bay al-dinari bi al= -dinar nasa'an, #386; also Muslim and Musnad Ahmad]

b. "There is no riba in hand-to-hand [spot] transactions." [Muslim, Kitab<= span style=3D'font-family:Arial'> al-<= span style=3D'font-family:Arial'>Musaqat, Bab bay'i<= span style=3D'font-family:Arial'> al-<= span style=3D'font-family:Arial'>ta'ami= mithlan bi <= span style=3D'font-family:Arial'>mithlin; also in Nasa'i]. =

<= /O>There are several variations of this hadith. None of these hadith is mutawatir= . Notably, this hadith in all its variations is quite categorical that there = is no riba in hand-to-hand or spot transactions. Thus, any transaction = that is otherwise permissible and it is a spot transaction, it can't involve = riba. Even the orthodoxy accepts these hadith as authentic (sahih), though= no certainty of knowledge is established by these hadiths, as these are not mutawatir. However, if this hadith is taken literally, as Allama Suhail points out: "these narrations demolish the self-invented castle of riba al-fadl= ." [p. 83]

The = hadith narrated by Usama - "There is no riba except in nasi'ah = or deferment" - suggests that deferment or credit involves riba. However, it is all too well known and supported by many hadiths that the Prophet had entered into credit transactions (nasi'ah) and also that= he has paid more than the original amount. Also, "Sahaba have paid more t= han the original amount at the time of repayment and the Prophet approved of it." [Suhail, p. 84]

Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume= 3, Book 34, Number 282:
Narrated 'Aisha:
The Prophet purchased food grains from a Jew on credit and mortga= ged his iron armor to him.

Volume 3, Book 41, Numbe= r 579:
Narrated Jabir bin Abdullah:
I went to the Prophet while he was in the Mosque. (Mis'ar thinks, that Jabir went in the forenoon.) After the Prophet told me to pray two Rak= at, he repaid me the debt he owed me and gave me an extra amount. <= /span>

If deferment or credit-based transactions (nasi'ah) does involve rib= a, which is categorically prohibited in the Qur'an, then how did the Prophet engage in such borrowing (#282) and how did he pay extra (another meaning o= f riba) as in #579 above? Are we to assume that the Jew who offered food to the Pro= phet on credit did not benefit from the transaction, and if he did, then isn't t= hat riba? It could be argued that both the abovementioned hadiths are from a period before riba was prohibited. However, then, we will be involved in ma= king an inference, because there is no definitive knowledge or informatio= n to support such an argument.

H= adith #2-3: Theme - In case of loans, no excess is to be accepted by the lender

2. From Anas ibn Malik: T= he Prophet, peace be on him, said: "If a man extends a loan = to someone he should not accept a gift." (Mishkat, op. cit., on the authority of <= span class=3Dspelle>Bukhari's Tarikh and Ibn Taymiyyah's al-<= span style=3D'font-family:Arial'>Muntaqa). =

3. From Abu Burdah ibn Abi Musa: I came= to Madinah and = met 'Abdallah ibn Salam wh= o said, "You live in a country where riba is rampant; hence if anyone o= wes you something and presents you with a load of hay, or a load of barley, or a rope of straw, do not accept it for it is riba." [Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume 5= , Book 58, Number 159].

Both= the hadiths above actually relate to the same theme. A lender should not accept= any excess (even in the form of gift) as part of or with the repayment of the principal. #2 Hadith above is not from any primary hadith collection. Mishk= at is a secondary source. Also, the two other sources, Bukhari's Tarikh (histo= ry) and Ibn Taymiyyah's al-Muntaqa are not hadith sources either. Hadith= #3 is from Sahih al-Bukhari. But neither of the preceding two hadiths is mu= tawatir.

The implication of these two hadiths is quite clear. Both of these hadiths emphasize the role of the lender. Nothing in excess of the principal should= be accepted by the lender. It does not say anything about the borrower not to = pay anything extra. Yet, these hadiths that disallow the lenders from accepting= an extra conflict with the Prophetic practice that he himself has offered extra and the lender accepted it [see the hadith from Bukhari #579 above]. Why wo= uld the Prophet forbid the lender to accept any extra, while he himself has paid extra? If this constitutes riba and it is prohibited, whether= in the Qur'an and/or hadith, then how does one reconcile the fact that in anot= her hadith, both the receiver and payer of the riba are identified as equally guilty?

Sahih Muslim, Book 010, Number 3854:
Abu Sa'id al-Khudri (r) reported Allah's Messenger (p) as saying: Gold is t= o be paid for by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley by barley, dates= by dates, salt by salt, like by like, payment being made hand to hand. He who = made an addition to it, or asked for an addition, in fact dealt in riba. = The receiver and the giver are equally guilty.

Also= , the two hadiths in theme #2-3, are contradicted by other hadiths that show that= the Prophet has approved of extra payments in settlement of debts. There are al= so cases where in settlement of in-kind borrowing involved better quality than= the original.

Narr= ated Abu Hurayrah that the Prophet borrowed a two-year-old camel and returned a similar camel, and in addition he gave another camel, and said: 'Best of you are the best in returning your debts.' [Suhail, p. 106, quoting Jami Al-Tirmidhi, Kitab al-Buyu, v.6, #56]

Sahih Muslim, Book 010, Number 3899:
Abu Huraira (r) reported: Allah's Messenger (p) took a camel on loan, and t= hen returned him (the lender) the camel of a more mature age and said: Good amo= ng you are those who are good in clearing off the debt.

Muwa= tta, Book 31, Number 31.42.91:
Malik related to me from Humayd ibn Qays al-Makki that Mujahid said, "Abdullah ibn Umar borrowed some dirhams from a man, then he discharged his debt with dirhams better than them. The man said, 'Abu Abdar-Rahman. Th= ese are better than the dirhams which I lent you.' Abdullah ibn Umar said, 'I k= now that. But I am happy with myself about that.' "

Suna= n Abu Dawood, Book 22, Number 3341:
Narrated Jabir ibn Abdullah:
The Prophet (p) owed me a debt and gave me something extra when he paid it.=

An a= rgument can be made that those hadiths, disallowing the lender to accept anything extra, were from a period before the prohibition of riba took place.= In that case, those hadiths can't be used for prohibition of riba. Furthermore, if this argument that those hadiths were from the pre-prohibit= ion period is valid, then once again, we have to contend with the problem that there is no definitive information or corroboration to that effect. Is there?

Anot= her plausible and sensible explanation is that those hadiths disallowing the lenders any excesses pertain to Qard al-Hasanah [2/al-Baqarah/245], a non-profit loan of benevolence. If so, then those hadiths simply reinforc= e the verse about Qard al-Hasanah. However, by the same token, any profita= ble transaction, whether interest-based or not, wouldn't be covered by those hadiths.

Indeed, riba r= elated hadiths do not use the term loan' (qard) or 'debt' (dayn). Abdullah Saeed discusses the following based on Muhammad Rashid Rida [d. 19= 35], an eminent scholar and the disciple of Shaikh Muhammad Abduh. <= /p>

"... [N]one of t= he authentic hadith attributed to the Prophet in relation to riba appea= rs to mention the terms, 'loan' (qard) or 'debt' (dayn). This absence of any reference to loans or debts in riba-related hadith led a minority of jurists to contend that what is actually prohibited as riba is certain form of sales, which are referred to in the hadith literature."= ; [quoting Rida, al-Riba wa al-Mu'amalat fir al-Is= lam, Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahira, 1959, p. 11]

Hadith #4-5: Theme - Barter/Trade except spot transactions or alikes (in quality or quantity) is prohibited

4a. From Abu Said al-Khu= dri: The Prophet (p), said: "Do not sell gold for gold except when it is li= ke for like, and do not increase one over the other; do not sell silver for si= lver except when it is like for like, and do not increase one over the other; an= d do not sell what is away [from among these] for what is ready." [Bukhari, Kitab= al-Buyu<= span class=3Dgrame>, Bab bay <= span class=3Dspelle>i al-fiddati bi al-fiddah, #385; also Muslim #3845, Tirmidhi, Nasai'i and Musnad Ahmad].

4b. From 'Ubada ibn al-Samit: The P= rophet (p), said: "Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley = for barley dates for dates, and salt for salt - like for like, equal for equal,= and hand-to-hand; if the commodities differ, then you may sell as you wish, provided that the exchange is hand-to-hand." [Muslim, Kitab al-Musaqat, Bab al-sarfi wa bay'i = al-dhahabi bi a= l-waraqi naqdan, #3853; also in = Tirmidhi].

These hadiths do not require separate explanation, because as already demonstrated above, hand-to-hand or spot transactions (bartering or trade) are permissib= le in Islam and such transactions do not involve riba. Notably, there i= s no reference to riba in the above two hadiths. But do these hadiths per= tain to riba at all? Well, to deal with that question, we need to move to= the next theme, which comes with similar hadiths, but specifically mention of t= he riba connection.

5a. From Abu Sa'id al-khudri: The Prophet (p) said: "Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, and salt for salt - like for like, and hand-to-hand. Whoever pays more or takes more has indulged= in riba. The taker and the giv= er are alike [in guilt]." [Sahih Muslim, #3854; and Musnad Ahmad].

In the preceding hadith, an additional statement with specific reference to riba is present: "Whoever pays more or takes more has indulged in riba." This is important because in this hadith a specific reference to riba is made, on the basis of which riba al-fadl (riba involving excesses in barter/trade) has been identified and declared prohibited by Islamic schola= rs and jurisprudents.

First, this is not a mutawatir hadith either, and thus does not yield certa= inty of knowledge. However, there are more problems with this preceding hadith w= ith the additional statement: "Whoever pays more or takes more has indu= lged in riba. The taker and the giver are alike [in guilt]." The way this hadith is narrated would give the impression that the additional (underlined) part is also from the Prophet. However, as Alla= ma Suhail convincingly has proven in his book What<= /span> is Riba? that this additional part is not fr= om the Prophet. [See pp. 63-68]

There are hadiths in Sahih Muslim that dispute this same hadith (reported by Ubad= ah bin Samit).

Sahih Muslim, Book 010, Number 3852:
Abil Qiliba reported: I was in Syria (having) a circle (of friends). in which was Mus= lim b. Yasir. There came Abu'l-Ash'ath. He (the narrator) said that they (the frie= nds) called him: Abu'l-Ash'ath, Abu'l-Ash'ath, and he sat down. I said to him: Narrate to our brother the hadith of Ubada b. Samit. He said: Yes. We went = out on an expedition, Mu'awiya being the leader of the people, and we gained a = lot of spoils of war. And there was one silver utensil in what we took as spoil= s. Mu'awiya ordered a person to sell it for payment to the people (soldiers). = The people made haste in getting that. The news of (this state of affairs) reac= hed 'Ubada b. Samit, and he stood up and said: I heard Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) forbidding the sale of gold by gold, and silver by silve= r, and wheat by wheat, and barley by barley, and dates by dates, and salt by s= alt, except like for like and equal for equal. So he who mad= e an addition or who accepted an addition (committed the sin of taking) interest= . So t= he people returned what they had got. This reached Mu'awiya. and he stood up to deliver an address. He said: What is the matter with = people that they narrate from the Messenger (may peace = be upon him) such tradition which we did not hear though we saw him (the Holy Prophet) and lived in his company? Thereupon, Ubida b. Samit stood up a= nd repeated that narration, and then said: We will definitely narrate what we heard from Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon = him) though it may be unpleasant to Mu'awiya (or he said: Even if it is against = his will). I do not mind if I do not remain in his troop in the dark night. Ham= mad said this or something like this.

Indeed, there are other narrations of the theme and narrated on the authority of the same companion Ubadah bin Samit, without any such additions.

Ubadah said: the Prophet of Allah (p) prohibited that we sell gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, and dates for dates. [Suhai= l, p. 66, quoting Sunan an-Nasai, Kitab al-Buyu, 275]

The following narration makes it further clear that the additional part is not = from the Prophet.

&quo= t;Muslim ibn Yasar and Abdullah ibn Ubayd, who was called 'Ibn Hurmuz,' narrated to = me that Ubadah ibn al-Samit and Mu'awiyah met once. Ubadah narrated to them: '= The Prophet, pbuh, forbade us to sell gold for gold, silver for silver, dates f= or dates, wheat for wheat, barley for barley -- one of them [the two narrators] said: 'and salt for salt' while the other did not say it -- except quantity for quantity and kind for kind. One of them said: whoever increase= d or sought an increase committed riba - the other [narrator] did not say it." [Suhail, p. 66, quoting an-Nasa'i, Kitab al-Buyu, 275]  = ;

Thus= , not only that this is not a mutawatir hadith, but also that the hadith narration has significant discrepancy and there seems to be a statement fro= m a companion of the Prophet that have been mixed up as a statement from the Prophet.

Ther= e is one other problem, and it's a rational one. In these hadiths, the Prophet s= eems to prohibit barter transactions, specifying five/six commodities, unless su= ch transactions are on the spot and alike in quality and/or quantity. However,= who in the world did or does exchange an ounce of gold of exact quantity and of same quality? What would be the rationale for exchanging a pound or kilo of barley with another pound or kilo of the same quality? Here it seems that t= he Prophet has permitted a kind of transaction that people have no reason to engage in? Usually, the permission involves something that people usually d= o or may indulge in as a habit or for some benefit or pleasure. In this case, no= ne of those possibilities apply. An equal amount of the same quality of gold w= ill be exchanged only by people without any sense. How in the world the Prophet would permit something that people cannot be expected to sensibly engage in= ?

That= takes us to hadiths pertaining to some allegedly prohibited transactions that took place in the context of Khaybar.

5b. From Abu Sa'id and Abu Hurayrah: A man employed by the Prophet, peace be on him, in Khaybar brought for him janib= [dates of very fine quality]. Upon the Prophet's asking him whether all the dates = of Khaybar were= such, the man replied that this was not the case and added that "they exchan= ged a sa [a measure] of this kind for two or three [of the other kind]". The Prophet, peace be on him, replied, "Do not do so. Sell [t= he lower quality dates] for dirhams and then use the dir= hams to buy janib. [When dates are exchanged against dates] they should be equal in weight.&qu= ot; [Sahih al-Bukhari, Kitab= al-Buyu<= span class=3Dgrame>, Bab idha<= span class=3Dgrame> arada= bay'a= tamrin bi tamrin khayrun minhu, Volume 3, Book 3= 8, Number 499; also Muslim; Muwatta, #31.12.20 and Nasa'i). =

5c. From Abu Sa'id: Bilal brought to the Prophet, peace be on him, some barni [good quality] dates whereupon the Prophet asked= him where these were from. Bilal replied, "I had some inferior dates which= I exchanged for these - two sas for a sa.&q= uot; The Prophet said, "Oh no, this is exactly riba. Do not do so, but w= hen you wish to buy, sell the inferior dates against something [cash] and then = buy the better dates with the price you receive." [Muslim, Kitab= al-Musaqat, Bab al-ta'ami mithlan bi mithlin, #3871; also Musnad Ahmad].

First, notice the discrepancy between two hadiths about the same incident. In the first one there is no reference to riba at all, while the second one specifically makes a connection to riba. Also, the wording is quite different. In the first one, it says: "Do not do so. Sell [the lower quality dates] for dirhams and then use the dir= hams to buy janib. [When dates are exchanged against dates] they should be equal in weight.= " In the second one, it says: "when you wish to buy, sell the inferior d= ates against something [cash] and then buy the better dates with the price you receive."

Obviously, even though the narrators are apparently quoting the Prophet, they are actu= ally narrating an incident in their own words. There are other reports of= the same incident that don't make any connection with riba at all. =

I had in the Prophet's [store] one mudd [of dates]. I found better [dates] be= ing sold at one sa' for two sa's, so I bought it [the better quality] and bought it to the Prophet. He asked, 'from where have you got it, Bilal? I said I bought one sa' for two s= a's. He said: 'return it and bring back to us our dates.' [Suhail, p. 55, quoting Sunan al-Darimi, Vol. 2, #257]

Some juicy dates were presented to the Holy Prophet. The Holy Prophet's dates fr= om [his own orchard] at Al-'Ula were of the dry kind. He asked: 'where from ha= ve you got these dates?' People replied: 'we have bought one sa' of this with two sa's of our dates.' He said: 'don't do it. It's not right.= But sell your dates and buy of this according to your need.' [Suhail, p. 55, quoting Sunan an-Nasa'i bi shar'hi as-Suyuti, Kitab al-buyu, Vol. 7, #272]<= /span>

So, what these hadiths are really about and why other hadiths of the same incid= ent end without any reference to riba? As Allama Suhail explains: "= [The above] hadith ends there. The reason for that order is obvious: the Holy Prophet lived a very simple and frugal life, eve= n the flour for his bread was not sieved. Then how could he tolerate that just for the sake of gratification of the palate, two sa's of dates be exchanged with one sa' of better quality dates. Shah Waliullah Muhaddith Dihlawi, too, has mentioned the same reason for non-permissibility of [this type of transacti= on, namely] muratalah." [p. 55]

H= adith #6: Theme - Transactions involving products of composite but separable components

6. From Fadalh ibn 'Ubayd al-Ansari: On t= he day of Khaybar he bought a necklace of gold and pearls for twelve dinars. On separating the two, he= found that the gold itself was to more than twelve dinars. So he mentioned this to t= he Prophet, peace be on him, who replied, "It [jewellery] must not be sold until= the contents have been valued separately." [Muslim, Kitab al-Musaqat, Bab bay'i al-qiladah fiha kharazun wa dhahab, #3864; also in Tirmidhi and Nasa'i].

As Allamah Suhail has capably demonstrated that none of the hadith pertaining = to this particular incident or transaction relates in any way to riba.<= /span> The rationale for this hadith= and the instruction it contains is quite simple. Often in barter transactions, = the initiating party of interest might be at a disadvantage and may not realize= the full market value of the product he or she trying to exchange. Selling the = item in possession for cash and then using the cash to purchase the item of inte= rest would generally yield proper market value. This has nothing to do with r= iba. Allamah Suhail explains:

"Khaybar was a c= entre of Jews who happened to be very rich. So when Khaybar was conquered Muslims= got a lot of booty which included silver and gold ware. Muslim mujahids = were used to a simple way of life, they did not know how to use those silver and gold wares, so they wanted to sell those wares for a trifle and get cash. M= any people in fact sold at a price much lower than the actual value, that is, silver wares and ornaments weighing one uqiyah were sold by them to = Jews for two or three pennies, whereas the weight of one uqiyah is several times more than two or three dinars.

When the Holy Prophet= came to know that the mujahids were carelessly selling the booty, and that too to the conquered and deceitful Jews, he ordered that the God-given weal= th should not be squandered like that, that at least they should not sell for a price less than that of its weight." [pp. 57-58]

In such context, sepa= rating necklace (with gemstones) and gold is expected to fetch better value for the Muslim sellers. By the way, these hadiths are not mutawatir either a= nd thus do not yield certainty of knowledge.

Definition or Conundrum?: The issue of illah

Fif= teen centuries after the Prophet, Muslims are still arguing whether the Tarawih prayer of Ramadan is twenty units or eight units, or whether amin sh= ould be said aloud in congregational prayers. Somehow to stake a bold claim that while the Qur'an does not define what is the prohibited riba, hadith= s do define riba, especially to be applied in our contemporary context, belies our historical legacy of our scholarship. Does bringing in the perti= nent hadiths in picture help with defining what does the prohibition cover in our current time or actually adds to a rather formidable conundrum?

To appreciate the nat= ure and the extent of the problem, it is important to refer to qiyas (analogical reasoning/deduction), the fourth source of Islamic jurisprudenc= e. For a detailed analysis of some pertinent issues, please read "Qiyas (Analogical Reasoning) and Some Problematic Issues in Islamic law."= ; Here, let's deal with illah, a core aspect of qiyas.

Technically, Qiyas is= the extension of Shari'ah value from an original case, or a= sl, to a new case, because the latter has the same effective cause as the forme= r. ... The main sphere for the operation of human judgment in qiyas is = the identification of a common illah between the original and the new ca= se. Once the illah is identified, the rules of analogy then necessitate = that the ruling of the given text be followed without any interference or change. [Kamali, pp. 264-265]

It is important to ke= ep in mind that qiyas is essentially speculative.

"The jurist who resort to qiyas takes it for granted= that the rules of Shari'ah follow certain objectives (maqasid) that are in harmony with reason. A rational approach to the discovery and identificatio= n of the objectives and intentions of the Lawgiver necessitates recourse to human intellect and judgement in the evaluation of ahkam. ... Since an enq= uiry into the causes and objectives of divine injunctions often involves a measu= re of juristic speculation, the opponents of qiyas have questioned its essential validity. Their argument is that the law must be based on certain= ty, whereas qiyas is largely speculative and superfluous. ... It is once again in recognition of this element of uncertainty in qiyas that the ulama of all the juristic schools have ranked qiyas as a 'speculative evidence'." [Kamali, p. 267]&n= bsp;

"From an epistemological point of view, the most important feature of the judgments concluded through analogy by 'illa is their being disputable. This results not only from the fact that the 'illa, by means of which these judgments are arrived at, can never be fully established or shown to be tru= e, therefore giving rise to different conceptions as to what constitutes a pro= per or acceptable 'illa." [Shehaby, p. 42]

One of the problems o= ur classical scholars have dealt with is how to apply the hadiths pertaining to what they identify as riba al-fadl. As they turned to qiyas, = they had to come up with an applied understanding of the illah (effective= or efficient cause; ratio decidendi) for the prohibition, so that it ca= n be determined whether the prohibition's scope is greater than what the specific hadiths explicitly mentions. Anyone who claims that hadith actually defines what is prohibited should also put the challenge in perspective, as even the classical scholars as well as the respective madhahib (schools) of jurisprudence have not been able to resolve. [See Engku Ali, undated]

The specific hadiths = in question identify six specific commodities: barley, date, wheat, salt, gold= and silver. The first issue is whether the prohibited riba covers only t= hese six commodities or more. The Zahiris, a literalist school, does not recogni= ze qiyas as a valid methodology of Islamic law. Therefore, there conclusion is simpl= e. The prohibition of riba applies to only these six commodities, speci= fied by the Prophet. No one has the authority to include anything else the Proph= et has not.

On = the basis of the six commodities enumerated by the Prophet there arises another question: why only these 'six commodities' were named? There were other thi= ngs also that were bartered in Arabia both i= n kind and on credit, such as, camel, sword, armour, clothes etc. The Prophet could have named those things as well. Fuqaha have given different answers to this question:

a. Allamah Dawud al-Zahiri and other Zahirites opine that there is riba onl= y in these six things, i.e., barley, wheat, dates, salt, gold and silver, and th= ere is no riba in the remaining things.

The only rational objection to this opinion is that rice, pulses, sugar have the same qualities that are found in barley and wheat etc., then why is the= re no riba in them? This is the reason why other fuqaha have looked for other reasons. [Suhail, p. 88]

The four orthodox sch= ools recognize qiyas as a valid methodological tool of Islamic jurisprude= nce. Therefore, they do engage in finding the effective cause or illah to identify additional or new situations to which the prohibition may apply. Q= uite interestingly, four schools reach three (or four) different conclusions.

b. According to Imam Shafi'i, edibility is the cause of riba in = the first four of the mentioned articles, and valuability [bearin= g a value] is the reason in the remaining two.

The= re are two objections to this definition: there are many other things which have edibility such as meat, vegetables, fruits, milk. Then why did the Holy Prophet not mention them?

Sec= ondly, no common reason for these six things has been mentioned. Otherwise everyth= ing has one or the other distinctive quality.

c. = In order to eliminate these objections, Hanafi fuqaha traced a common feature in the 'six commodities,' that is, measurability and weighbili= ty, and held this to be the reason for riba.

But= the fallacy of this approach is so obvious that it does not require much argume= nt. We admit that those six commodities were sold by weight or by measures, but this common feature should have something common with riba. The logic here = is this: all crows are forbidden and all crows are black, so the black colour = is the reason for prohibition!

...=

d. = In the opinion of Imam Malik, there is riba in storable [non-perishable] edi= bles only and there is no riba in any other commodity. As for gold and silver mentioned in the hadith, it is secondary, that is, in itself it is not a ca= use for riba but as they are used as a means to buy storable [non-perishable] edibles so they have been mentioned in the hadith as a means to buy non-perishable edibles. [Suhail, pp. 88-89]

Hanbali opinion is si= milar to the Shafi'i's. [Engku Ali]

Mohammad Obaidullah, = an Islamic economist and a promoter of Islamic finance, attempts to present the diversity of opinions in more modern terms. However, the diversity of opini= on is still obvious. Readers should draw their own conclusion whether this diligent search for illah (effective or efficient cause) leads to a harmonious definition or not.

"The Shafi= 46;i school of fiqh considers the efficient cause (illah) in case of gold= and silver to be their property of being currency (thamaniyya) or the me= dium of exchange, unit of account and store of value.** However, the efficient c= ause (illah) of being currency (thamaniyya) is specific to gold and silver, and cannot be generalized. That is, any other object, if used as a medium of exchange, cannot be included in their category. Hence, according = to this version, the Shariah injunctions for riba prohibition are not applicable to paper currencies. The Maliki view also considers the efficient cause ( illah) in case of gold and silver= to be their property of being currency (thamaniyya) or the medium of excha= nge, unit of account and store of value. However, according to this view, = even if paper or leather is made the medium of exchange and is given the status = of currency, then all the rules pertaining to naqdain, or gold and silv= er apply to them. Thus, according to this view, exchange involving currencies = of different countries at a rate different from unity is permissible, but must= be settled on a spot basis. As far as Hanbali view is concerned, different versions attributed to Ahmad Ibn Hanbal have been recorded as documented in al-Mughni by lbn Qudama. The first version is similar to the Hanafi version while the second version is close to the Shafi’i and Maliki version.**" [p. 7]

Also, pertinent in th= is context is The Text of the Historic Judgment on Interest by the Supreme Cou= rt of Pakistan, a relevant part of which was authored by Justice/Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani. Usmani is one of the leading religious experts on Islamic fina= nce and much sought after by Islamic financial institutions for their Shari'ah Boards. In the Historic Judgment, he identifies excess over principle as th= e illah.

"... [T]he appli= cation of a law depends on the Illat and not on the Hikmat. ... The = Illat (the basic feature) on which the prohibition is based is the excess claimed over and above the principal in a transaction of loan, and as soon as this = Illat is present, the prohibition will follow regardless of whether the philosoph= y of the law is or is not visible in a particular transaction. [Supreme Court of Pakistan, see the segment "Basic cause of prohibition"; link for = the online document is provided in the bibliography]

S= everal points to be noted. First, illah is categorically delinked from hikmah or underlying wisdom/rationale. A rather dangerous proposi= tion, reflecting a purely legalistic approach. Also, quite typical to many religious scholars, Mufti Usmani discusses the difference between illah<= /i> and hikmah without mentioning that his analysis reflects only the Ha= nafi and Shafi'i position, but not Maliki and Hanbali position.

The majority view mai= ntains that the rules of Shari'ah are founded on their causes (ilal), not in their objectives (hikam). From this, it would follow that a hukm shar'i is present even if its 'illah is not, and hukm shar'i<= /i> is absent in the absence of its 'illah ev= en of its hikmah is present. The jurist and the judge must therefore enfor= ce the law whenever its 'illah is known to exist regardless of its h= ikmah. ...

The Malikis and the Hanbalis, on the other hand, do not draw any distinction between the 'il= lah and the hikmah. In their view, the hikmah aims to attract an evident benefit or preventing an evident harm, and this is the ultimate objective of the law. When, for example, the law allows the sick not to obs= erve the fast, the hikmah is the prevention of hardship to them. Likewise= the hikmah of retaliation (qiyas) in deliberate homicide, or of t= he hadd penalty in theft, is to protect the lives and properties of the people. Sin= ce the realisation of benefit (maslahah) and prevention of harm (maf= sadah) is the basic purpose of all the rules of Shari'ah, it would be prope= r to base an analogy on the hikmah. ...

The Hanafis and the Shafi'is, however, maintain that 'illah must be both evident and constant. In their view the 'illah secures the hikmah most of= the time but not always." [Kamali, pp. 276-277]

Thus, the position Mu= fti Usmani articulates is essentially Hanafi and Shafi'i, but Mufti Usmani does= not disclose that in the Historic Judgment.

Secondly, the illa= h is identified as "excess claimed over and above the principal in a transaction of loan. However, there are hadiths that&nb= sp; contradict such grand assertion, because the Prophet himself has paid extra above the principal.

A third and quite illuminating aspect is an illustration used by Mufti Usmani, which shows how ridiculous or shallow arguments can be used by such people who are consider= ed among leading foremost authorities. Usmani explains why zulm (injust= ice or oppression) can't be accepted as illah.

"The principle i= s that the application of a law depends on the Illat and not on the Hikm= at. In other words, if the Illat (the basic feature of the transaction) = is present in a particular situation while the Hikmat (the wisdom) is not visualized, the law will still be applicable. This principle is recognized = in the secular laws also. Let us take a simple example. The law has made it compulsory for the vehicles running on the roads to stop when the red street light is on. The Illat of this law is the red light, while the Hi= kmat is to avoid the chances of accidents. Now, the law will be applicable whene= ver the red light is on; its application will not depend on whether or not ther= e is an apprehension of an accident. Therefore, if the red light is on, every vehicle must stop, even though the roads of both sides have no other traffi= c at all." [section 119]

Let's scrutinize this example of red light as illah. Yes, law requires that all vehicles m= ust stop at the red light, regardless of whether other sides have any traffic or not. However, when this rule (and it is a very important, generally life-sa= ving rule) is delinked from hikmah (wisdom) the life-saving rule can beco= me a life-claiming rule. Suppose a vehicle has stopped at red light. There are no other traffic from any other direction. However= , a tornado is right behind the stopped vehicle. If illah (delinked from wisdom) would indicate that the vehicle still must wait. Period. However, illah (still connected with the wisdom) would dictate that = the vehicle may ignore the red light (even at the cost of a traffic citation). = If this example of red light is taken seriously, then under certain circumstan= ces, the life-saving red-light can be life-claiming. If such an illah can= be identified that could be applied like a robot (without any human judgment or wisdom) that would be really welcome. However, this is precisely where lega= lism fails us by insisting robotic illah. That such pitiful reasoning com= es from eminent (and currently among the highest paid Shari'ah experts in the Islamic finance industry) is a matter of great concern.

F= ourthly, using this 'illah and hikmah distinction he makes another argument that undermines the very Qur'anic concept of justice ('adalah).

&= quot; ... after prohibiting the transaction of riba, the Holy Qur'an has mentioned the Zulm= as a Hikmat or a philosophy of the prohibition, but it does not mean that prohibition will not be applicable if the element of Zulm appears to be mis= sing in a particular case. The Illat (the basic feature) on which the prohibitio= n is based is the excess claimed over and above the principal in a transaction of loan, and as soon as this Illat is present, the prohibition will follow regardless of whether the philosophy of the law is or is not visible in a particular transaction." [Supreme Court of Pakistan, Section 120]=

"Any relative te= rm which is ambiguous in nature cannot be held to be the Illat of a particular= law because its existence being susceptible to doubts and disputes, it would de= feat the very purpose of the law. The Zulm (Injustice) is a relative and rath= er ambiguous term the exact definition of which is very difficult to ascertain. Every person may have his own view about what is or what is not Zulm.&q= uot; [Section 121]

If the above assessme= nt of the notion of justice/fairness (adalah) is correct, then basically t= he kind of pristine Islamic concept of justice as mentioned in the Qur'an does= not really have any functional relevance. The Qur'an categorically calls for justice as one of its hallmark principles and values.

&= quot;O ye who believe! stand out firmly for justice, as witness= es to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whethe= r it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. Follow not the lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort (justice) or decline to do justice, verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do. [4/an-Nisa/135]

&= quot;O ye who believe! stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hat= red of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do." [5/al-Ma'ida/8]

The Qur'anic call to = stand for justice presumes that people know and understand what justice is. If justice (or injustice) is such an elusive, ambiguous or relative thi= ng, then basically such a clarion call is rendered vacuous. Mufti Usmani may not have thought of such ramifications in writing the Historic Judgment. <= /span>

Fifthly, as qiyas<= /i> as a methodology of human reasoning, the search of illah as part of that methodology is essentially speculative. However, Mufti Usman's position is a typical orthodox position, where there is arbitrariness in the determinatio= n of illah. In the Qur'an, the principle is laid out: wa 'in tubtum fa-lakum ru'usu amwalikum la tazlimuna wa-la tuzlamun; that = is: "(a) if ye turn back, ye shall have your capital sums: (b) Deal not unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly." [2/al-Baqarah/= 279] However, the part (a) is recognized as illah, delinking it with part (b). This is an unacceptable approach.

"Jurists ... gen= erally do not discuss why one person would want to sell a measure of wheat for an equal measure of wheat, particularly on an on-the-spot basis. It seems that= the intended meaning of the hadith was not very clear even = to many jurists. For instance, some jurists thought that the prohibition of riba in what came to known as riba al-fadl (riba involving an exce= ss in one of the countervalues mentioned in the hadith) was to be observed and complied with ... without probing into the reasons for the prohibition. For these jurists, as reported by Rida, the purpose of the prohibition of <= i>riba al-fadl was not comprehensible but still had to be complied with. =

This confusion among jurists appears to have been due to their total disregard for the ration= ale (hikmah) of the prohibition of riba." [Saeed, p. 32]=

N= otably, the "reason why the scholars have regarded hikma as minor and unimport= ant appears to be that the 'illa could be used objectively and easily ..= . a decision arrived at on the basis of 'illah could remain 'immutable'." [Saeed, p. 36] However, the result of the delinking of the illah (efficient cause) and hikmah (rationale) caused noticeable disagreem= ents as to how to apply qiyas to riba, especially in riba al-fa= dl. Indeed, often the conclusions various schools are so ridiculously divergent/contradictory.

The inadequacy of the= 'illa approach is glaringly obvious in the discussion of riba in both the early and the modern period. In the case of riba as prohibited in th= e sunna for instance, each school of law arrived at an '= illa which had nothing to do with the circumstances of the transaction, the parties thereto, or the importance of the commodity to the survival of soci= ety. There was no emphasis on the moral aspect. This approac= h, which could be described as superficial and devoid of moral and humanitarian considerations, led to some amazing conclusions by several jurists. Coins like fals (note: a unit of currency made of a metal which is n= ot gold or silver and was used in some parts of the Muslim world), for instanc= e, did not involve riba, according to Shafi'is. Thus, one hundred fa= ls could be exchanged for two hundred either on the spot or on a deferred deli= very basis. If this is maintained, then obviously today's fiat [i.e. paper] money could also be put in this category, since it is neither gold nor silver currency. Commodities which were countable, like apples or eggs, did not involve riba, and hence could be exchanged less for more, according = to some jurists. A piece of cloth could be exchanged for two pieces of the same quality and measure since it was neither 'currency' nor 'measurable' nor 'weighable', nor a 'foodstuff'. A commodity to which the 'illa did n= ot apply could not be susceptible to riba (mal ribawi) whatever = the importance of that commodity to the well-being of the community. ...=

The lack of moral emp= hasis in the juristic interpretation of riba has also led to some other unfortuna= te developments as in the case of riba-related hiyal. From the medieval period to the present day, it has been possible to advance loans at exorbitant rates of interest using fictitious transactions. Similarly, the = six commodities and other goods likely to involve riba could be exchange= d. Many jurists would not regard such acts as reprehensible since they are perfectly in line with their legalistic thinking. These jurists accord grea= ter importance to the legal form of the transaction than to the moral consequen= ces. As long as the transaction literally does not fall into the definition of <= i>riba, as provided by each school of law, the transaction would not be regarded as such." [Saeed, pp. 37-38]

S= o, those who regard "edibility" as 'illah do not consider cloth sub= ject to riba. For them, eggs, apples, chilli pepper, onions would be covered by riba because of edibility. However, for the Malikis, these items would not be subject to riba because these are NOT storable (non-perishable) edible.

These problems are du= e to the fact that in general the Muslim jurists were not interested in the underlying reason behind the original illah.

"It should be ma= de clear at the outset that on the whole, Muslim legal theorists were not basically interested in analyzing the ways for discovering the reason why a certain judicial judgment was stated. Rather they were looking for some methodological rules that would help them in deciding whether to accept or reject a given 'illa." [Shehaby, p. 37]

Are we, thus, any bet= ter off in using 'illah without any reference to hikmah (rational= e), as articulated by Mufti Usmani in the Historic Judgment? Are we any closer = to a definition, as claimed by Abdulkader Thomas?

Claiming that interes= t is prohibited because of the Qur'anic prohibition on the basis of "no exc= ess over the principal", but delinked from "Deal not unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly" - both in the same verse - is an eye-opening illustration of a mechanical and legalistic approach, where it = is expressly asserted that the jurists' task is to apply illah without = any regard to rationale or wisdom. Thus, while the exponents of Islamic finance= and banking routinely offer pious statements about Islam's prohibition of ri= ba (and interest, as part of the riba-interest reductionism) based on t= he injustice and exploitation argument, when it comes to the application, sudd= enly injustice and exploitation become immaterial or irrelevant. [see Farooq, "Exploitation, Profit and the Riba-Interest Reductionism"= ]

Conclusion

The limited purpose o= f this essay is to explore whether the commonly cited hadiths to define riba actually do the job as claimed. While the prohibition in the Qur'an can be easily understood in the case of riba al-jahiliyyah, and the rationa= le for it is unmistakably clear, all the hadiths cited to define riba a= nd especially to broaden the scope to show that interest in the modern economy= in all its form (including interest in a competitive, regulated environment) is prohibited is a daunting task indeed.

Readers might remembe= r that Abdulkader Thomas, an expert in Islamic finance, asserted that these "six" hadiths define what is prohibited as riba. Of course= , it is not just Thomas, but also the orthodoxy uses these hadiths to define = riba. But in light of the analysis here, let it be left with the readers to draw their own conclusion whether these hadiths really define what is claimed as prohibited in our contemporary context.

Readers are also recommended to read:

·      =    The Riba-Interest Equation and Islam: Reexamination of the Traditional Arguments

·      =    The Riba-Interest Equivalence:= Is There Any Ijma (Consensus)?

Bibliography

Engku Rabiah Adawiya = Engku Ali. "Riba and Prohibition in Islam," International Is= lamic University, Malaysia [undated]

Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam [New Delhi, India: Hindustan Publications, undated]

Mahmoud El-Gamal. &qu= ot;An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Riba in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence," Proceedings of the Third= Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, Cambridge: C= enter for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 2000, p= p. 31-44. http://w= ww.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/riba.pdf

Mohammad Omar Farooq. "Exploitation, Profit and The Riba-Interest Reductionism" [unpublished essay; available online] June 2005

Muhammad Mazhar Iqbal= . "A Broader Definition of Riba," Pakistan Institut= e of Development Economics.

Mohammad Hashim Kamal= i. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence [Cambridge, UK: Islam= ic Texts Society, 2003]

Ibn Majah. Sunan Ibn = Majah, trans. by Muhammad T. Ansari [Kazi Publications, 1995]

Mohammed Obaidullah. = "Financial Options in Islamic Contracts: Potential Tools f= or Risk Management," J. KAU Islamic Econ., Vol. 11, pp. 3-26, = 1999.

Fazlur Rahman. “= Riba and Interest,” Islamic Studies (= Karachi) 3(1), Ma= r. 64:1-43.

Abdullah Saeed. Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of= Riba and its Contemporary Interpretation [New York: E. J. Brill, 1996] [A MUST reading for anyone interested in the contemporary discourse on Riba and interest, especially from a critical perspective]

Nabil A. Saleh. Unlaw= ful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking= [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1= 986]

Nabil Shehaby. "= Illa and Qiyas in Early Islamic Legal Theory," Journal of American Orien= tal Society, Vol. 102, Issue 1, Jan-Mar 1982, pp. 27-46.

Mohammad Nejatullah S= iddiqi. Riba, Bank Interest, and The Rationale of Its Prohibit= ion [Islamic Development Bank, Visiting Scholars Research Series, 2004]<= /p>
Iqbal Ahmad Khan Suha= il. What is Riba? [New Delhi= , India: Pharos, 1999]
S= upreme Court of Pakistan. The Text of the Historic Judgment on Interest [1999; = exact date: 14 Ramadan, 1420]

Frank Vogel and Samuel Hayes, III. Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return [The Hague: Kluwer= Law International, 1998]

M. Raquibuz Zaman and Hormoz Movassaghi. "Islamic Banking: A Performance Analysis," The Journal of Global Business, Volume 12, No. 22, Spring 2001, pp. 31-38.

*At the= Study Resources Page of this author, there is a collection of works that deals wi= th the issue of equating interest with Riba from a critical perspective. See t= he entries under Islamic Economics/Finance/Banking. http://glo= balwebpost.com/farooqm/study_res/default.html

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