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Promise to purchase ( Top
) Another important issue in Murabahah financing which has been
subject of debate between the contemporary Shari‘ah Scholars is that the
bank/financier cannot enter into an actual sale at the time when the
client seeks murabahah financing from him, because the required commodity
is not owned by the bank at this stage and, as explained earlier, one
cannot sell a commodity not owned by him, nor can he effect a forward
sale. He is, therefore, bound to purchase the commodity from the supplier,
then he can sell it to the client after having its physical or
constructive possession. On the other hand, if the client is not bound to
purchase the commodity after the financier has purchased it from the
supplier, the financier may be confronted with a situation where he has
incurred huge expenses to acquire the commodity, but the client refuses to
purchase it. The commodity may be of such a nature that it has no common
demand in the market and is very difficult to dispose of. In this case the
financier may suffer unbearable loss. Solution to this problem is
sought in the murabahah arrangement by asking the client to sign a promise
to purchase the commodity when it is acquired by the financier. Instead of
being a bilateral contract of forward sale, it is a unilateral promise
from the client which binds himself and not the financier. Being a
one-sided promise, it is distinguishable from the bilateral forward
contract. This solution is subjected to the objection that a
unilateral promise creates a moral obligation but it cannot be enforced,
according to Shari‘ah, by the courts of law. This leads us to the question
whether or not a one-sided promise is enforceable in Shari‘ah. The general
impression is that it is not, but before accepting this impression at its
face value, we will have to examine it in the light of the original
sources of Shari‘ah. A thorough study of the relevant material in the
books of Islamic jurisprudence would show that the fuqaha’ (the Muslim
jurists) have different views on the subject. Their views may be
summarized as follows:
1. Many of them are of the opinion
that 'fulfilling a promise' is a noble quality and it is advisable for the
promisor to observe it, and its violation is reproachable, but it is
neither mandatory (wajib), nor enforceable through courts. This view is
attributed to Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam al-Shafi‘i, Imam Ahmad and to some
Maliki jurists 1 However as will be shown later, many Hanafi and Maliki
and some Shafi‘i‘ jurists do not subscribe to this view.
2.
A number of the Muslim jurists are of the view that fulfilling a promise
is mandatory and a promisor is under moral as well as legal obligation to
fulfil his promise. According to them, promise can be enforced through
courts of law. This view is ascribed to Samurah b. Jundub the well known
companion of the Holy Prophet  Umar b. Abdul Aziz, Hasan
al-Basri, Sa‘id b. al-Ashwa‘, Ishaq b. Rahwaih and Imam al-Bukhari. The
same is the view of some Maliki jurists, and it is preferred by
Ibn-al-‘Arabi and Ibn-al-Shat, and endorsed by al-Ghazzali, the famous
Shafi‘i jurist, who says the promise is binding, if it is made in absolute
terms. The same is the view of Ibn Shubrumah. The third view is presented
by some Maliki jurists. They say that in normal conditions, promise is not
binding, but if the promisor has caused the promise to incur some expenses
or undertake some labor or liability on the basis of promise, it is
mandatory on him to fulfil his promise for which he may be compelled by
the courts. Some contemporary scholars have claimed that the jurists
who have accepted the binding nature of a promise have done so only with
regard to unilateral gifts or other voluntary payments, but none of them
has accepted the binding nature of a promise to effect a bilateral
commercial or monetary transaction. However, based on a close study, this
notion does not seem to be correct, because the Maliki and Hanafi jurists
have allowed 'Bai‘ bil wafa' on the basis of binding promise. Bai‘ bil
wafa' is a special kind of sale whereby the purchaser of an immovable
property undertakes that whenever the seller will give him the price back,
he will resell the house to him. The question of validity of 'Bai‘bil
wafa' has already been discussed in detail in the first chapter while
explaining the concept of house financing on the basis of 'diminishing
musharakah'. The gist of the discussion is that if repurchase by the
seller is made a condition for the original sale, it is not a valid
transaction, but if the parties have entered into the original sale
unconditionally, but the seller has signed a separate and independent
promise to repurchase the sold property, this promise will be binding on
the promisor and enforceable through the courts. The binding nature of the
promise in this case has been admitted by both Maliki and Hanafi jurists.
1 Obviously, this promise does not relate to a gift. It is a promise
to effect a sale in future. Still, the Maliki and Hanafi jurists have
accepted it as binding on the promisor and enforceable through the courts.
It is a clear proof of the fact that the jurists who hold the promises to
be binding do not restrict it to the promises of gifts etc. The same
principle is applicable, according to them, to the promises whereby the
promisor undertakes to enter into a bilateral contract in future. In
fact, the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet are very particular about
fulfilling promises. The Holy Qur’an says:
And fulfil the covenant. Surely, the covenant will be
asked about (in the Hereafter) (Bani Isra’il : 34)
 O
those who believe, why do you say what you not do. It invites Allah's
anger that you say what you not do. (al-Saf:2 to 3) Imam Abu Bakr
al-Jassas has said that this verse of the Holy Qur’an indicates that if
one undertakes to do something, no matter whether it is a worship or a
contract, it is obligatory on him to do it. The Holy Prophet is reported to have
said:  There are
three distinguishing features of a hypocrite: when he speaks, tells a lie,
when he promises, he backs out and when he is given something in trust, he
breaches the trust. 2 This is only an example. There is a large number
of injunctions in the ahadith of the Holy Prophet where it is ordained to fulfil
the promises and it is clearly prohibited to back out, except for a valid
reason.
Therefore, it is evident from these injunctions that
fulfilling promise is obligatory. However, the question whether or not a
promise is enforceable in courts depends on the nature of the promise.
There are certainly some sorts of promises which cannot be enforced
through courts. For example, at the time of engagement the parties promise
to go through the marriage. These promises create a moral obligation, but
obviously they cannot be enforced through courts of law. But in commercial
dealings, where a party has given an absolute promise to sell or purchase
something and the other party has incurred liabilities on that basis,
there is no reason why such a promise should not be enforced. Therefore,
on the basis of the clear injunctions of Islam, if the parties have agreed
that this particular promise will be binding on the promisor, it will be
enforceable.
This is not a question pertaining to murabahah alone.
If promises are not enforceable in the commercial transactions, it may
seriously jeopardize commercial activities. If somebody orders a trader to
bring for him a certain commodity and promises to purchase it from him, on
the basis of which the trader imports it from abroad by incurring huge
expenses, how can it be allowed for the former to refuse to purchase it?
There is nothing in the Holy Qur’an or Sunnah which prohibits the making
of such promises enforceable.
It is on these grounds that the
Islamic Fiqh Academy Jeddah has made the promises in commercial dealings
binding on the promisor with the following conditions,
(a)
it should be one-sided promise.
(b) the promise must have
caused the promise to incur some liabilities
(c) If the
promise is to purchase something, the actual sale must take place at the
appointed time by the exchange of offer and acceptance. Mere promise
itself should not be taken as the concluded sale
(d) If the
promisor backs out of his promise, the court may force him either to
purchase the commodity or pay actual damages to the seller.1 The actual
damages will include the actual monetary loss suffered by him, but will
not include the opportunity cost.
On this basis, it is allowed
that the client promises to the financier that he will purchase the
commodity after the latter acquires it from the supplier. This promise
will be binding on him and may be enforced through courts in the manner
explained above. This promise does not amount to actual sale. It will be
simply a promise and the actual sale will take place after the commodity
is acquired by the financier for which exchange of offer and acceptance
will be necessary.
Securities Against
Murabahah Price ( Top
) Another issue regarding murabahah financing is that the murabahah
price is payable at a later date. The seller/financier naturally wants to
make sure that the price will be paid at the due date. for this purpose,
he may ask the client to furnish a security to his satisfaction. The
security may be in the form of a mortgage or a hypothecation or some kind
of lien or charge. Some basic rules about this security must, therefore,
be kept in mind.
1. The security can be claimed rightfully
where the transaction has created a liability or a debt. No security can
be asked from a person who has not incurred a liability or debt. As
explained earlier, the procedure of murabahah financing comprises of
different transactions carried out at different stages. In the earlier
stages of the procedure, the client does not incur a debt. It is only
after the commodity is sold to him by the financier on credit that the
relationship of a creditor and debtor comes into existence. Therefore, the
proper way in a transaction of murabahah would be that the financier asks
for a security after he has actually sold the commodity to the client and
the price has become due on him, because at this stage the client incurs a
debt. However, it is also permissible that the client furnishes a security
at earlier stages, but after the murabahah price is determined. In this
case, if the security is possessed by the financier, it will remain at his
risk, meaning thereby that if it is destroyed before the actual sale to
the client, he will have either to pay the market price of the mortgaged
asset, and cancel the agreement of murabahah, or sell the commodity
required by the client and deduct the market price of the mortgaged asset
from the price of the sold property.
(2) It is also
permissible that the sold commodity itself is given to the seller as a
security. Some scholars are of the opinion that this can only be done
after the purchaser has taken its delivery and not before. It means that
the purchaser shall take its delivery, either physical or constructive,
from the seller, then give it back to him as mortgage, so that the
transaction of mortgage is distinguished from the transaction of sale.
However, after studying the relevant material, it can be concluded that
the earlier jurists have put this condition in cash sales only and not in
credit sales.
Therefore, it is not necessary that the purchaser
takes the delivery of the sold property before he surrenders it as
mortgage to the seller. The only requirement would be that the point of
time whereby the property is held to be mortgaged should necessarily be
specified, because from that point of time, the property will be held by
the seller in a different capacity which should be clearly earmarked. For
example, A sold a car to B on first of january for a price of Rs.
500,000/- to be paid on 30th June. A asked B to give a security for
payment at the due date. B has not yet taken delivery of the car and he
offered to A that he should keep the car as a mortgage from 2nd January.
If the car is destroyed before 2nd of January the sale will be terminated
and nothing will be payable by B. But if the car is destroyed after the
second of January, sale is not terminated, but it will be subject to the
rules prescribed for the destruction of a mortgage. According to Hanafi
jurists, in this case, the seller will have to bear the loss of the car,
to the extent of its market price or its agreed sale price, whichever is
lesser. Therefore, if the market price of the car was 450,000/- he can
claim only the remaining part of the agreed sale price (i.e. Rs. 50,000/-
in the above example). If the market price of the car is Rs. 500,000/- or
higher, nothing can be claimed from the purchaser.
This is the
view of Hanafi School. The Shafi‘i and Hanbali jurists hold that if the
car is destroyed by the negligence of the mortgagee, he will have to bear
the loss, according to its market price, but if the car is destroyed
without any fault on his part, he will not be liable to anything, and the
purchaser will bear the loss and will have to pay the full price. It
is clear from the above example that the possession of A over the car as a
seller carries effects and consequences different from his possession as a
mortgagee and therefore it is necessary that the point of time on which
the car is held by him as a mortgagee should clearly be defined. Otherwise
different capacities will be mixed up giving rise to dispute and rendering
the security invalid.
Guaranteeing the
Murabahah ( Top
) The seller in a murabahah financing can also ask the purchaser/client
to furnish a guarantee from a third party. In case of default in the
payment of price at the due date, the seller may have recourse to the
guarantor, who will be liable to pay the amount guaranteed by him. The
rules of Shari'ah regarding guarantee are fully discussed in the books of
Islamic fiqh. However, I would point out to two burning issues in the
context of Islamic banking.
1. The guarantor in the
contemporary commercial atmosphere does not normally guarantee a payment
without a fee charged from the original debtor. The classical Fiqh
literature is almost unanimous on the point that the guarantee is a
voluntary transaction and no fee can be charged on a guarantee. The most
the guarantor can do is to claim his actual secretarial expenses incurred
in offering the guarantee, but the guarantee itself should be free of
charge. The reason for this prohibition is that the person who advances
money to another person as a loan cannot charge a fee for advancing a
loan, because it falls under the definition of riba or interest which is
prohibited. The guarantor should be subject to this prohibition all the
more, because he does not advance money. He only undertakes to pay a
certain amount on behalf of the original debtor in case he defaults in
payment. If the person who actually pays money cannot charge a fee, how
can fee be charged by a person who has merely undertaken to pay and did
not pay anything in actual terms?
Suppose, A has borrowed 100 US
dollars from B who asked him to produce a guarantor. C says to A, "I pay
off your debt to B right now, but you will have to pay me 110 dollars at a
later date." Obviously 10 dollars charged from A are not allowed, being
interest. Then D comes to A and says, "I stand as a guarantor to you, but
you will have to pay me 10 dollars for this service." If we allow to
charge a fee for guarantee, it will mean that C cannot charge 10 dollars,
despite the fact that he has actually paid the amount, and D can charge 10
dollars, despite the fact that he has merely committed himself to pay only
when A fails to pay. This being unfair apparently, the classical Muslim
jurists have forbidden the charging of a fee for guarantee, so that both C
and D, in the above example, may stand on equal footing.
However,
some contemporary scholars are considering the problem from a different
angle. They feel that guarantee has become a necessity, especially in
international trade where the sellers and the buyers do not know each
other, and the payment of the price by the purchaser cannot be
simultaneous with the supply of the goods. There has to be an intermediary
who can guarantee the payment. It is utterly difficult to find the
guarantors who can provide this service free of charge in required
numbers. Keeping these realities in view, some Shari'ah scholars of our
time are adopting a different approach. They say that the prohibition of
guarantee fee is not based on any specific injunction of the Holy Qur'an
or the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet . It has been deduced from the
prohibition of riba as one of its ancillary consequences. Moreover,
guarantees in the past were of simple nature. In today's commercial
activities, the guarantor sometimes needs a number of studies and a lot of
secretarial work. Therefore, they opine, the prohibition of the guarantee
fee should be reviewed in this perspective. The question still needs
further research and should be placed before a larger forum of scholars.
However, unless a definite ruling is given by such a forum, no guarantee
fee should be charged or paid by an Islamic financial institution.
Instead, they can charge or pay a fee to cover expenses incurred in the
process of issuing a guarantee.
Penalty of Default ( Top
) Another problem in murabahah financing is that if the client defaults
in payment of the price at the due date, the price cannot be increased. In
interest-based loans, the amount of loan keeps on increasing according to
the period of default. But in murabahah financing, once the price is
fixed, it cannot be increased. This restriction is sometimes exploited by
dishonest clients who deliberately avoid to pay the price at its due date,
because they know that they will not have to pay any additional amount on
account of default.
This characteristic of murabahah should not
create a big problem in a country where all the banks and financial
institutions are run on Islamic principles, because the government or the
central bank may develop a system where such defaultors may be penalized
by depriving them from obtaining any facility from any financial
institution. This system may serve a a deterrent against deliberate
defaults. However, in the countries where the Islamic banks and financial
institutions are working in isolation from the majority of financial
institutions run on the basis of interest, this system can hardly work,
because even if the client is deprived to avail of a facility from an
Islamic bank, he can approach the conventional institutions. In order
to solve this problem, some contemporary scholars have suggested that the
dishonest clients who default in payment deliberately should be made
liable to pay compensation to the Islamic bank for the loss it may have
suffered on account of default. They suggest that the amount of this
compensation may be equal to the profit given by that bank to its
depositors during the period of default. For example, the defaulter has
paid the price three months after the due date. If the bank has given to
its depositors a profit at the rate of 5%, the client has to pay 5% more
as compensation for the loss of the bank. However, the scholars who allow
this compensation make it subject to the folowing conditions:
(a) The defaulter should be given a grace period of at
least one month after the maturity date during which he must be given
weekly notices warning him that he should pay the price, otherwise he will
have to pay compensation. (b) It is proved beyond doubt that
the client is defaulting without valid excuse. If it appears that his
default is due to poverty, no compensation can be claimed from him.
Indeed, he must be given respite until he is able to pay, because the Holy
Qur’an has expressly said,
 And if he (the debtor) is short of funds, then he must be
given respite until he is well off. (2:280)
(c) The
compensation is allowed only if the investment account of the Islamic bank
has earned some profit to be distributed to the depositors. If the
investment account of the bank has not earned profit during the period of
default, no compensation shall be claimed from the client. This
concept of compensation, however, is not accepted by the majority of the
present day scholars. (including the author). It is the considered opinion
of such scholars that this suggestion neither conforms to the principles
of Shariah nor is it able to solve the problem of default. First of
all, any additional amount charged from a debtor is riba. In the days of
jahiliyyah (before Islam) the people used to charge additional amounts
from their debtors when they were not able to pay at the due date. they
used to say,
 Either you pay off the debt or you increase the payable
amount. The aforementioned suggestion of paying compensation to the
creditor/seller resembles the same attitude. It can be argued that the
above suggestion is theoretically different from the practice of
jahilliyah in that the suggestion is to grant the debtor a grace period of
one month to make sure that he is avoiding payment without a valid cause
and to exempt him from compensation if it appears that his non-payment is
due to poverty or a hardship. But in practical application of the concept,
these conditions are hardly fulfilled, because every debtor may claim that
his default is due to his financial inability at the due date, and it is
very difficult for a financial institution to hold an inquiry about the
financial position of each client and to verify whether or not he was able
to pay. What the banks normally do is that they presume that every client
was able to pay unless he has been declared as bankrupt or insolvent. It
means that the concession allowed in the suggestion can be enjoyed only by
the insolvent people. Obviously, insolvency is a rare phenomenon, and in
this rare situation, even the interest-based banks cannot normally recover
interest from the borrower. Therefore, the suggestion leaves no practical
and meaningful difference between an interest based financing and an
Islamic financing. So far as grace period is concerned, it is a minor
concession which is sometimes given by the conventional banks as well.
Once again, in practical terms, there is no material difference between
interest and the late payment charged as compensation. It is argued in
favor of charging compensation that the Holy Prophet ? has condemned the person who
delays the payment of his dues without a valid cause. According to the
well-known hadith he has said,
 The well-off person who delays the payment of his debt,
subjects himself to punishment and disgrace."
The argument
runs that the Holy Prophet ? has permitted to inflict a punishment on such
a person. The punishments may be of different kinds, including the
imposition of a monetary penalty. But this argument overlooks the fact
that even if it is assumed that imposing fine or a monetary penalty is
allowed in Shariah,1 it is imposed by a court of law and is normally paid
to the government. Nobody has allowed a situation where an aggrieved party
imposes the fine on its own (and for its own benefit) without a judgment
of a court, competent to decide the matter.
Moreover, had it been
a recognized punishment, it should have been imposed even if the
investment account has earned no profit during that period, because the
guilt of the defaulter is established and it has no nexus with the profit
of the investment account of the bank.
In fact, the suggestion of
compensation equal to the rate of profit of the investment account is
based on the concept of opportunity cost of money. This concept is foreign
to the principles of Shariah. Islam does not recognize opportunity cost of
money, because after the elimination of interest from the economy, money
has no definite return. It is always exposed to loss as well as it has the
ability to earn a profit. And it is the risk of loss which makes it
entitled to gain a return.
Another point is worth attention. The
one who defaults in payment of debt is, at the most, like a thief or a
usurper. But the study of the rules prescribed for theft and usurpation
would show that a thief has been subjected to very severe punishment of
amputating his hands, but he was never asked to pay an additional mount to
compensate the victim of theft. Similarly, if a person has usurped the
money of another person, he may be punished by way of ta‘zir, but no
Muslim jurist has ever imposed on him a financial penalty to compensate
the owner. Imam al-Shafi’i is of the view that if someone usurps the
land of another person, he will have to pay the rent of the land according
to the market rate. But if he has usurped money, he will return the equal
amount of money and not more.
All these rules go a long way to
prove that the opportunity cost of money is never recognized by the
Islamic Shari‘ah, because, as explained above, money has no definite
return, nor any intrinsic utility.
On the basis of what is stated
above, the idea of compensation to be charged from a defaulter is not
approved by most of the contemporary scholars. The question was thoroughly
discussed in the annual session of Islamic Fiqh Academy, Jeddah, and it
was resolved that no such compensation is allowed in Shariah.
All
this discussion relates to the impermissibility of the proposed
compensation in Shariah. Now it is to be noted that this proposal does not
solve the problem of default at all. To the contrary, it may encourage the
debtors to commit as much default as they wish. The reason is that,
according to this suggestion, the defaulter is asked to pay compensation
equal to the return earned by the depositors during the period of default.
It is evident that the rate of return earned by the depositors is always
less than the rate of profit paid by the customer in a Murabahah
transaction. Therefore, the customer will be paying after default, much
less than he was paying before the default. Therefore, he would willingly
accept to pay this amount and not pay the amount of price which he will
invest in a more profitable activity. Suppose the rate of profit agreed in
a murabahah transaction of six moths is 15% p.a. and the rate of profit
declared to the depositors is 10%. p.a. It means that if the client
withholds the price of murabahah after its maturity date and keeps it for
another six months, he will have to pay the compensation at the rate of
10% p.a. which is much less than the rate of original murabahah (i.e.
15%). As such he will default and enjoy another facility for the next six
months at a lesser rate.
This proposal, therefore, is not only
against Shariah, but also deficient in meeting the problem of default. The
Alternative suggestion The question now arises as to how the banks and
financial institutions may solve this problem. If nothing is charged from
the defaulters, it may be a greater incentive for a dishonest person to
default continuously. Here is the answer to this question:
We have
already mentioned that the real solution to this problem is to develop a
system where the defaulters are duly punished by depriving them from
enjoying a financial facility in future. However, as commented earlier,
this may be only where the whole banking system is based on Islamic
principles, or the Islamic banks are given due protection against
defaulters. Therefore, up to a time when this goal is reached, we may need
some other alternative.
For this purpose it was suggested that the
client, when entering into a murabahah transaction, should undertake that
in case he defaults in payment at the due date, he will pay a specified
amount to a charitable fund maintained by the bank. It must be ensured
that no part of this amount shall form part of the income of the bank.
However, the bank may establish a charitable fund for this purpose and all
amounts credited therein shall be exclusively used for purely charitable
purpose approved by the Shari‘ah. The bank may also advance interest-free
loans to the needy persons from this charitable fund.
This
proposal is based on a ruling given by some Maliki jurists who say that if
a debtor is asked to pay an additional amount in case of default, it is
not allowed by Shari'ah, because it amounts to charging interest. However,
in order to assure the creditor of prompt payment, the debtor may
undertake to give some amount in charity in case of default. This is, in
fact, a sort of Yamin (vow) which is a self-imposed penalty to keep
oneself away from default. Normally, such 'vows' create a moral or
religious obligation and are not enforceable through courts. However, some
Maliki jurists allow can be made it justiceable, and there is nothing in
the Holy Qur'an or in the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet which forbids making this 'vow'
enforceable through the courts of law. Therefore, in cases of genuine
need, this view can be acted upon. But, while implementing this proposal,
the following points must be kept in mind.
1. The proposal
is meant only to pressurize the debtors on paying their dues promptly and
not to increase the income of the creditor / financier, nor to compensate
him for his opportunity cost. Therefore, it must be ensured that no part
of the penalty forms part of the income of the bank in any case, nor can
it be used to pay taxes or to set-off any liability of the financier.
2. Since the amount of penalty is not deserved by the
financier as his income, but it goes to charity, it may be any amount
willfully undertaken by the debtor. It can also be determined on per cent
per annum basis. Therefore, it may serve as a real deterrent against
deliberate default, unlike the former suggestion of compensation which, as
explained earlier, may tend to encourage the defaults.
3.
Since the penalty undertaken by the client is originally a self-undertaken
vow, and not penalty charged by the financier, the agreement should
reflect this concept. Therefore, the proper wording of the penalty clause
would be on the following pattern, "The client hereby undertakes that
if he defaults in payment of any of his dues under this agreement, he
shall pay to the charitable account/fund maintained by the Bank/Financier
a sum calculated on the basis of ...% per annum for each day of default
unless he establishes through the evidence satisfactory to the
Bank/financier that his non-payment at the due date was caused due to
poverty or some other factors beyond his control."
4. Being
a vow of charitable act, it was originally permissible for the client to
give the stipulated amount to any charity of his own choice, but in order
to ensure that he will pay, the charitable account or fund maintained by
the financier/bank is specified in the proposed undertaking. This specific
undertaking does not violate any principle of Shariah. However, it is
necessary that the bank or the financial institution maintains a separate
fund, or at least, a separate account for this purpose and the amounts
credited to that account must be spent in well-defined charities known to
the client/debtor. This proposal has now been implemented successfully
in a large number of Islamic financial institution.
No Roll Over in Murabahah ( Top
) Another rule which must be remembered and fully complied with is that
murabahah transaction cannot be rolled over for a further period. In an
interest-based financing, if a customer of the bank cannot pay at the due
date for any reason, he may request the bank to extend the facility for
another term. If the bank agrees, the facility is rolled over on the terms
and conditions mutually agreed at that point of time, whereby the newly
agreed rate of interest is applied to the new term. It actually means that
another loan of the same amount is re-advanced to the borrower.
Some Islamic banks or financial institutions, who misunderstood
the concept of murabahah and took it as merely a mode of financing
analogous to an interest-based loan, started using the concept of
roll-over to murabahah also. If the client requests them to extend the
maturity date of murabahah, they roll it over and extend the period of
payment on an additional mark-up charged from the client which practically
means that another separate murabahah is booked on the same commodity.
This practice is totally against the well-settled principles of Shariah.
It should be clearly understood that murabahah is not a loan. It
is the sale of a commodity the price of which is deferred to a specific
date. Once the commodity is sold, its ownership is passed on to the
client. It is no more a property of the seller. What the seller can
legitimately claim is the agreed price which has become a debt payable by
the buyer. Therefore, there is no question of effecting another sale on
the same commodity between the same parties. The roll-over in murabahah is
nothing but interest pure and simple because it is an agreement to charge
an additional amount on the debt created by the murabahah sale.
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